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bstract
This paper studies the differential impact on IPO firm listing prospectus length from increasing proportions of foreign directors from civil as
pposed to common law societies and social elites. Using a unique hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 165 IPO firms from across 18
frican countries the evidence suggests that increasing proportions of directors from civil code law countries is associated with shorter prospectuses
hile the opposite is true for their common law counterparts. Furthermore increasing proportions of directors drawn from elevated social positionsn indigenous society is related to increasing prospectus length in North Africa while being insignificant in SSA.
 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.   
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.  Introduction
The increasing globalisation of financial markets and impe-
us to attract foreign investment capital and enhance domestic
iquidity has underscored the importance of accurate and timely
rm-level disclosures through detailed listings prospectuses as
ell as on-going commitments such as annual reports and finan-
ial reporting that are obligatory to maintaining a stock exchange
isting (Cottle et al., 1989). However while development policy
n Africa as with elsewhere has focussed on the harmonization
f accounting standards, listings criteria and financial reporting
he importance of the deeper institutional environment under-
ining the social context of the regulatory requirements has
een largely overlooked in the literature (Fogarty and Rogers,
005). Hearn (2013) undertook a recent study of the institutional
eterminants of IPO firm prospectus length in a cross-country
omparative setting with a sample drawn from across Africa.
owever this was limited to well established macro-institutional∗ Correspondence address: School of Business, Management and Economics,
antell Building, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK.
el.: +44 01273 678377.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.easures. However deeper consideration of the indigenous insti-
utional environment facilitates understanding of considerable
ross-country variation in enforcement of disclosure practices
Hope, 2003) as well as the degree of successful adoption of
icro-Anglo Saxon (for example US, UK and Netherlands) as
pposed to macro-continental (for example France, Germany
nd Portugal) accounting practices as outlined by Nobes (1983).
s such the first contribution to the literature is in underscor-
ng the role and importance of institutions in shaping disclosure
ithin the developing context of Africa.
There is a considerable amount of research in accounting
iterature focussing on quality and timeliness of listed firm’s
isclosure in enhancing liquidity through a reduction of bid-ask
preads (Soltani, 2002), improving cost of equity and cost of
apital (Armstrong et al., 2011) and increasing post-IPO equity
rices (Hanley and Hoberg, 2010), thereby indicating quality
nd a reduction of inventory risk (see Stoll, 2000 for com-
lete discussion relating to inventory risk of market makers).
owever much of this research focuses on secondary trad-
ng markets albeit with the exception of Hanley and Hoberg
2010) that concentrates on initial primary offerings (IPOs)
ith all focussing on single market studies primarily in US
nd Europe. Recently a separate and distinct cross-country
omparative sub-literature has evolved distinguishing between
isclosure practices and enforcement of accounting standards,
xemplified by Hope (2003), which builds on the accounting
ractice distinctions of earlier work by Nobes (1983) between
icro-Anglo Saxon and macro-continental European systems.
hese distinctions themselves build on Gray’s (1988) theory
f cultural influence in accounting, itself drawing inspiration
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rom the inaugural cross-cultural research of Hofstede (1980)
hich explored four societal traits, namely individualism, power
istance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, across 40
ountries. Nobes distinguishes between macro-continental and
icro-Anglo Saxon with the former being characterized by rela-
ively weak accounting professions, inactive equity markets, and
ith relatively uniform and inflexible practices that are legalistic
nd tax-based, which are also detailed as “code law countries”
n Mueller et al. (1991), while the latter are determined by weak
overnmental influence, strong accounting professions, active
arkets and a focus on provision of detailed earnings and valu-
tion information for external stakeholders (Beattie and Jones,
001).
A very recent evolution in accounting literature in Armstrong
t al. (2010) relates levels of disclosure to the amelioration
f informational asymmetry between principals (owner-
hareholders) and agents (incumbent managers) drawing on
orporate governance mechanisms that mitigate some of these
gency costs given the viewpoint of the firm in being a complex
exus of contractual relations amongst stakeholders (Jensen and
eckling, 1976). Armstrong et al. (2010) adopt the view that
he firm’s contractual arrangements, in particular those relat-
ng to informal contracting implicit in information disclosure,
volve together with the wider corporate information environ-
ent in resolving agency conflicts and alleviating agency costs.
his builds on the extensive literature regarding the role of the
oard of directors as a governance mechanism for alleviating
gency costs between managers and directors (Fama and Jensen,
983) as well as between insider (executive) directors, charged
ith decision-making and strategy, and outsider (nonexecu-
ives), charged with decision monitoring on behalf of principals
r shareholders. This underscores the view in agency theory of
he board of directors in mitigating the downside risks asso-
iated with the increasing agency between dispersed minority
xternal principals entering the organizational structure for first
ime at IPO as principals and incumbent agents. In particular the
ole of nonexecutives is ascribed with importance in their role
f monitoring executives and management on behalf of the new
xternal principals at IPO and thereafter (Jensen and Meckling,
976). These central tenets of the agency perspective in having
een developed in the large common law US equity market have
argely shaped the Anglo-Saxon (US/UK) shareholder value
odel of governance. This in itself is founded on English com-
on law legal and judicial systems as well as an environment
tructured by political, governmental and more generally insti-
utions derived from the US and UK. This generally favours the
rimacy of capital markets as being the central form of external
nance for firms with the underlying obligation to maximiz-
ng protection of property rights of minority investors (La Porta
t al., 1998, 2000). In contrast the dominance of institutions cen-
red on French civil code law which strongly influenced the legal
ystems of Spain and Portugal favour legal, political and govern-
ental apparatus that enhances centralized control, in particularhat of the state, over and above that of the individual. As such
a Porta et al. (1998, 2000) ascribe this emphasis, together with
heir relegation of judiciary to a more administrative role of
aw formed by central legislators rather than a competitive case
i
s
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by-case process based on precedent in common law jurisdic-
ions, as inferring significantly weaker protection of property
ights of minority external investors. The transplantation of insti-
utional legal, judicial, political and governmental frameworks
uring colonial expansion of European nations as well as their
holesale adoption by some societies to achieve economic com-
etitiveness (La Porta et al., 2008) has inferred a considerable
egree of commonality amongst otherwise geographically dis-
ersed Anglo, Franco and Lusophone countries across Africa.
iven the significant differences in individuals perceptions of
eality influencing their decision making processes, subject to
heir bounded rationality, behavioural decision theory, which
s part of the wider socio-cognitive perspective (Stein, 1997;
angevoort, 1998), provides a useful theoretical framework in
nderstanding differences between individuals originating from
ivil code law as opposed to common law countries. These
ifferences are due to the underlying institutions underscoring
ach environment being encompassed in very different cognitive
tructures with directors from civil code law countries placing
ess emphasis on implementing mechanisms protecting minor-
ty external shareholders than their common law counterparts.
hese differences have significant implications for agency costs,
n part reflected in levels of informational disclosure to external
rincipals and the length or size of IPO prospectuses, taken as
epresentative of levels of information disclosure (following Li,
008). As such my second contribution to the literature arises
hrough an application of two complementary theoretical per-
pectives: that of behavioural decision and agency theories in
scribing differences between board members from civil code
s opposed to common law institutional backgrounds and their
mpact on the size IPO prospectuses.
A final further extension of this approach in attributing dif-
erences between directors in accordance to the institutional
nvironments in their countries of origin is in considering the
nstitutional environment of directors from social elites in local
ndigenous societies. While a common feature of countries from
cross Africa at independence was the presence of a social elite
o whom former colonial authorities bequeathed state machin-
ry such as legal, judicial, political and governmental apparatus
here are significant institutional differences between North
nd Sub Saharan African sub regions. The former is charac-
erized by the presence of extended family networks and their
ervasive influence on pyramidal ownership and extensive cross-
hareholdings amongst firms within local business environment
Hearn, 2011). The elevated role of family in the economy is
artly due to the prevalence of classical Islamic institutions and
ocial morality values within the underlying societal matrices
f North African countries (Kuran, 2004). This also serves as
n effective means in facilitating inter-generational transfer of
ealth and capital given otherwise complex inheritance rights
nder classical Islamic law (Kuran, 2004). However the gov-
rnance environment centred on the separation of ownership
nd control engendered through extended family networks also
nfers considerable potential for expropriation of minority out-
ider investors (Claessens et al., 1999, 2000). The dominance of
he North African regions political economies by extended fam-
ly networks has been highlighted through the very recent social
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tuses were hand-collected from the Ghana and Tanzania (Dar
Stock Exchange) stock exchanges and Bolsa de Valores de
Cabo Verde (Cape Verde Islands exchange) as well as from the
1 Bourse Regionale des Valeurs Mobilieres (BRVM) was established in 1973
as the Bourse de Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire. However, given the economic and
monetary union of Francophone West African countries (UMEAO) the local6 B. Hearn / Review of Devel
nd political upheaval across the region collectively referred
o as the Arab Spring (BBC news, 2011). This is in line with
arlier work by North (1991) who argued that the capture of
omestic polity and state institutions by narrow interest groups
ith considerable private benefits of control ultimately gener-
ted economic stagnation. This is the logical result through their
ack of incentive to engage in effective reforms that would oth-
rwise result in a more equitable redistribution of wealth across
ociety. Lavelle (2001), Joireman (2001, 2006) and Hearn and
iesse (2009) find evidence that the domination of polity as well
s legal, judicial and governmental apparatus by social elites
mpowered at independence is also prevalent across Sub Saha-
an Africa (SSA). However additional complexities underscore
hese countries. Often the legal and judicial system bequeathed
y former colonial metropoles was focussed solely towards the
oal of subjugating and controlling the indigenous population
iven the importance of the region in terms of its extractive
ndustry in colonial trading networks (Joireman, 2001). The
nformal institutional environment is largely formed on commu-
itarian values engendered within Ubuntu philosophy (Rossouw,
009) engendering social and economic outcomes at odds with
nstitutions centred on Western philosophical constructs such
s those associated with common and civil code law. Further-
ore many countries across SSA had dual legal systems where
ndigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, applicable to the
ajority of population, operated side-by-side with legal, judi-
ial and governmental institutions designed to promote interests
f narrow colonial administrations. Early post-independence
olicy marker’s sought to wholly disband the former indige-
ous systems and extend the systems inherited from former
olonial metropoles (Joireman, 2001) with the net result of fur-
her disenfranchising indigenous population. This has largely
esulted in the further empowerment of social elites that inher-
ted control from former colonial administrations following
ndependence. Consequently the SSA region has some of the
ighest transactions costs in the world through an incongruous
t between many newly formed countries informal institutions
nd societal matrices based on traditional structures, values
nd beliefs and narrow largely incomplete formal institutions
ormed on archaic versions of elements of law and govern-
ental bureaucracy designed to engender extractive industries
hat were centrepiece to colonial administration. This has also
esulted in business environments being characterized by dense
ocial networks and orientation towards relationships in order to
itigate these transactions costs (North, 1989) which promotes
rms raising finance through internal sources or from relation-
hip based means such as business angels and the banking sector
Kenny and Moss, 1998) rather than external capital markets.
hese issues have contributed considerably to the lack of an
xternal market finance culture across the SSA region as well
s the underdeveloped nature and inactivity of the regions stock
arkets. In the light of the importance of internal or relationship
ased finance across SSA and the presence of extended fam-
ly networks to pool and coordinate resources in North Africa
ndividuals and in particular directors are likely to place less
mphasis on the attraction of minority external investors that
orm the centrepiece of external financing models. As such the
e
a
d
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hird contribution to the literature is in a unique assessment of the
mpact of directors from an indigenous social elite background
n amounts of disclosure, revealed through the length of IPO
isting prospectuses.
The remainder of this article comprises of four sections.
he next section outlines the data while Section 3 outlines the
ypotheses, literature support for the variables, and methodol-
gy. Section 4 discusses results while the final section concludes.
.  Data
The dataset construction involved two sequential steps. The
rst involved forming an accurate and comprehensive list of Ini-
ial Primary Offerings (IPOs) to have been undertaken across the
orth African markets of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
nd the Sub Saharan African (SSA) markets of Cape Verde
slands (Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde), Cameroon (Bourse
e Douala), BRVM1 (Cote d’Ivoire), Malawi, Kenya, Uganda,
anzania, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritius
main board) and Ghana for the period of 2000–2011. Nigerian
ists were only available from 2002 to 2011. The main board of
he stock exchange of Mauritius was selected while the more
ecently established development board was omitted owing to
he necessity of including genuine IPOs as opposed to registra-
ions and introductions that infer little true attempt at ownership
iversification and which are more prevalent on this lower tier
f listing. The primary source for lists were the national stock
xchanges and their associated websites and these were cross
hecked with lists sourced from major brokerage houses to
nsure accuracy in the case of Nigeria and Zambia. The three
istings on the embryonic Algerian exchange were undertaken
n the initial period following inception between 1998 and 2000
nd have been included. This resulted in a list of 236 listings
aving taken place across Africa.
The second stage involved the procurement of IPO prospec-
uses that entailed the listing of ordinary shares with single class
oting rights thereby excluding preferred stock, convertibles,
nit and investment trusts as well as readmissions, reorgani-
ations and demergers and transfers of listings between main
nd development boards. Flotation prospectuses were hand-
ollected from financial market regulator websites for Algeria
nd for Morocco while a combination of Thomson Corporation
erfect Information and Al Zawya databases were used to source
gyptian prospectuses. Al Zawya database, the national stock
xchange and direct contact with individual firms were used
o source prospectuses for Tunisia. Similarly in SSA prospec-xchange was extended in 1998 to a regional basis and participation was encour-
ged, both in new listings as well as investment. Union Monétaire et Économique
e l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UMEAO) countries include Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo,
urkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.
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tock exchange website for the Bourse de Douala (Cameroon
xchange) (DSX website, 2010) while the Thomson Corpora-
ion Perfect Information database was used in the first instance to
ource Nigerian, Malawian and Kenyan prospectuses. This was
urther augmented by sourcing individual prospectuses from the
ational stock exchanges and individual firms although response
ates were low in sourcing prospectuses direct from firms them-
elves. Pangea Stockbrokers (Zambia) as well as individual
oated firms were the source of prospectuses for the Zambian
tock market. A final source in the case of SSA was African
inancials website (African Financial website, 2011). This final
tage resulted in a sample of 165 IPOs to have occurred across
frica. Share prices were obtained from Bloomberg, DataS-
ream and direct from the national stock exchange in Cape Verde
nd Cameroon as well as and Al Zawya for Egypt and Tunisia
nd the national stock exchange in Algeria. US$ exchanges rates
ere obtained from Bloomberg.
.  Methodology
This study is focussed on the internal firm-level board
overnance, performance and ownership and external legal envi-
onment quality determinants of IPO firm prospectus length
ithin the developing region of Africa. This region is character-
zed by narrow political economies largely controlled by social
lites empowered at independence from colonial metropoles
ith business environments dominated by dense social networks
nd relationships. These dense social networks act to reduce
ransactions costs (North, 1990) which are exceptionally high
iven the incomplete legal, judicial and governmental institu-
ions and largely inhibit externally sourced finance (Joireman,
001). However there is considerable variation in institutional
uality, levels of development of capital markets, and ability
f firms in accessing viable cost effective sources of exter-
al finance. This merits the study of the determinants of IPO
rospectus length first on a comprehensive African sample fol-
owed by the splitting of the sample between North African
egion and its Sub Saharan African counterpart. This splitting
f the sample is justified by the evidence that North and Sub
aharan African regions have very different business environ-
ents with equally contrasting informal institutional societal
atrices (Hearn, 2011, 2012). However a major considera-
ion in the smaller datasets of IPO firms inherent in Africa
s the effect of small sample bias on the statistical inference
f models used. Attempts to mitigate these concerns cen-
re on the employment of unbalanced pooled cross sectional
LS models that draw statistical strength from both longi-
udinal and cross sectional elements as well as the use of a
maller number of independent variables in line with recom-
endations in Good and Hardin (2009). The reduction in the
umber of independent variables is even more important owing
o the presence of missing data in some of the IPO firms
hat is itself responsible for the small sample sizes encoun-
ered in the models. Consequently the effects of small sample
ias should be taken into consideration when interpreting the
esults.
p
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.1.  IPO  ﬁrm  prospectus  length
The benefits of using dependent variable of natural logarithm
f IPO prospectus length (in pages) is that this can be attributed
o levels of disclosure by the firm which facilitate the wider study
f levels of disclosure to internal board governance as well as
rm performance and ownership and wider still country-level
egal quality measures. The length of IPO prospectus is defined
s:
n(IPO prospectus length)t=Ln(number of pages of document)
(1)
The use of the natural logarithm of the number of pages of
rospectuses is necessitated by skewness in number of pages
cross firm’s prospectuses and some extreme values. This fol-
ows from the employment of similar techniques in Li (2008)
wing to the considerations in handling length (measured in
ords) of annual reports. Equally the use of natural logarithm
ransformed prospectus length facilitates the measuring of pro-
ortionate effects of variables on prospectus length through the
egression coefficients rather than the more bulky absolute size
ffect as would otherwise be the case in non-log transformed
ata. This is also similar to the techniques used in the related
tudy of Hearn (2013).
.2.  IPO  ﬁrm  board  governance  determinants  of  IPO
rospectus length
The mainstream international corporate governance litera-
ure views an IPO as being the first major “liquidity event” in
he life cycle of fast growing firms when founders and initial
nvestors (corporate insiders) begin the process of realizing the
alue of their ownership stake in the firm (Brav and Gompers,
003). However the agency theory perspective views this dis-
ersion of ownership away from the concentrated control of
he initial entrepreneur-owner as giving rise to potential down-
ide risks and agency costs from a misalignment of interests
etween incumbent managers and executives (agents) and exter-
al minority investors (principals) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
dverse selection and moral hazard problems arise from the
symmetric information between new owners (investors) and
ncumbent managers (agents) as there are incentives for the lat-
er to mislead or even worse expropriate the former (Bruton
t al., 2010; Boulton et al., 2009). As such the board of direc-
ors itself can be viewed as being a tool which can act to better
lign incentives of various principals and agents and facilitate
ommunication and information disclosure thereby reducing
symmetric information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). How-
ver while the agency theoretic perspective ascribes a decision
onitoring and control role for the board in terms of regulation
f the firm’s internal affairs evidence from the field of cognitive
sychology infers that directors from countries with fundamen-
ally different legal traditions as well as social and political
overnance structures will have different impacts in their func-
ions within the board (Stein, 1997; Langevoort, 1998). In
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articular cognitive dissonance has been advanced as a basic
oncept in social psychology in referring to the tendency of
ndividuals to unconsciously adjust their beliefs and attitudes
o conform to voluntary choices previously made (Akerloff and
ickens, 1982; Langevoort, 1998). Behavioural decision theory
ncapsulates these constructs in advancing a perspective that
umans are subject to heuristics, biases and other subjective rea-
oning that are both systematic and predictable across a group
r society that cause departures from rational decision mak-
ng processes envisaged in neoclassical economics (Langevoort,
998). This socio-cognitive perspective of the governance struc-
ures governing human behaviour within a society relies heavily
n institutions and their role in enabling individuals otherwise
onstrained or bounded in their ability to interpret all informa-
ion available (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; North, 1989) as
ell as provide further subjective guidance on the interpretation
f situations and information arising from decisions which in
urn informs the progressive modification of these underlying
ental constructs in terms of shared inter-subjective percep-
ions of reality across a society (Stein, 1997). Institutions inform
he establishment of routines and patterns of behaviour which
hrough an on-going process of replication and modification
cross transactions within a society can outlive the historical
ontext that gave rise to the establishment of the institutions
n their original form. Given this evidence of the pervasive
ature of deeper routines and inter-subjective perceptions of
eality arising from across a society shaping human choices
hrough bounded or constrained decision making then individ-
als from fundamentally different societies are likely to reflect
ontrasting norms, values and belief structures (Anderson, 1990;
illiamson, 2002).
One consequence arising from this socio-cognitive perspec-
ive, or behavioural decision theory, is that individuals from
ountries with common law legal origins, together with the
olitical, governmental and institutional structures supporting
his legal form will have fundamentally different perceptions
f reality from those from civil code law countries. In partic-
lar Coffee (2000) ascribes differences between common law
nd civil code law systems in terms of reliance in the former
n law being formed from a competitive process of competing
ase arguments and precedent with judge and judiciary presid-
ng over process, while in the latter system law is passed largely
y legislature and judges relegated to a more administrative role.
qually commercial and regulatory law as well as political and
overnmental systems in civil code law countries tend to engen-
er the rights of centralized authority of the state over those of
ndividuals (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000, 2008). Contrast-
ngly La Porta et al. argues that common law legal, political and
overnance systems are more protective of the rights of minor-
ty individual. As a consequence the evidence from La Porta
uggests that common law countries ascribe a greater role for
xternal financial markets through their enhanced protection of
utsider minority investors than their civil code law counter-
arts where finance is obtained either through internal means
r relationship orientated bank-based financial systems. These
ifferences between common law and civil code law countries
hape institutions that inform the inter-subjective perceptions
t
i
n
int Finance 3 (2013) 84–98
f reality across societies and the mental model constructs of
eality of individuals that originate from within them. As a conse-
uence behavioural decision theory will impact on the potential
gency costs between minority outside investors (principals)
articipating for first time in IPO firm’s divestment of ownership
nd incumbent management and executives (agents) through the
tructure and composition of the board of directors. In particu-
ar differences between individuals originating from civil code
aw as opposed to common law societies with their contrasting
ehaviours and perceptions of reality perpetuated through insti-
utions common to each society will have a considerable impact
n agency relationships within an organization. In particular a
ombination of behavioural decision theory and the more con-
entional agency perspective infers that increasing proportions
f directors from civil code law societies will likely place less
mphasis on protection of minority outsider investors in contrast
o centralized control by dominant block-shareholder. This lack
f adherence to external market model of financing will also
ave implications on the amount of disclosure with this being
ecreased in relation to the lack of emphasis placed on role
f minority external (outsider) investors. In the light of these
heoretical predictions I test the following hypothesis:
1. The ratio of foreign directors from civil code law countries
o total board size is negatively associated with IPO-firm
rospectus length.
A similar conjecture is derived from behavioural decision
heory in terms of the proportion of directors from common
aw societies where accepted societal behavioural norms, values
nd shared beliefs infused into informal institutions, such as
usiness culture and routines, as well as general understanding
f formal codified legal statutes (Stein, 1997; Langevoort, 1998).
his leads to an enhanced emphasis of their perceptions of the
mportance of the role of minority investors as well as their
rotection through increased amounts of disclosure. As a result
f the familiarity with more market-orientated external finance
ystems directors from common law countries are more likely
o adhere to shareholder value governance models. These being
nformed by agency theory would seek to increase disclosure
hereby incentivizing firm insiders (agents) to act in the interests
f external (outside) investors in accordance to the ownership
iversification model envisaged by agency theory (Jensen and
eckling, 1976). Consequently I test the following hypothesis:
2. The ratio of foreign directors from common law countries
o total board size is positively associated with IPO-firm prospec-
us length.
The consideration of the role of indigenous high society direc-
ors and their impact on the effectiveness of the board as a control
nd monitoring device involves drawing from North (1989) in
n application of transaction cost economics to advance political
heory. In particular North argues that while very narrow polit-
cal economies underscored by dense social networks mitigate
ransactions costs associated with domestic financing through
nformation engendered within localized relationships, these do
ot promote strong third party contracting necessary to stimulate
ndustrialization and larger scale production. Joireman (2001,
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006) characterizes African political economies in being narrow
nd dominated by an often narrow group of social elites that took
ver the legal, political and governance institutions immediately
ollowing independence from former colonial metropoles. Given
he considerable private benefits of control at a state-level North
1989) argues that institutional inertia will arise from a lack of
ncentives to enact real reforms that would otherwise redistribute
he considerable wealth accumulation and opportunities of those
arrow interest groups.
Following on from the above argument indigenous high soci-
ty directors are more likely to be in positions that will enable
heir ability to benefit from private benefits of control of firms
nd less incentivized to disclose information given the lack of
edia and analyst scrutiny in domestic African markets owing
o their underdeveloped nature. Equally given the dense social
etworks characterizing many of the regions markets finance is
ore likely to be relationship-based with little regard for exter-
al capital markets thereby mitigating the necessity for more
etailed disclosure and hence prospectus length. Equally given
he domestic indigenous institutional environment is more likely
o favour relationship-based finance given the dense network of
ocial networks forming many African business environments
North, 1989) high society directors are less likely to be incen-
ivized to facilitate information production nor its acquisition by
xternal (outsider) shareholders. Consequently I test the follow-
ng hypothesis:
3. The ratio of indigenous high society executives to total
oard size is negatively associated with IPO-firm prospectus
ength.
.3.  Hypothesis  variables
Ratio of foreign directors from civil code law countries to
otal board size: This is defined as the number of directors from
ivil code law origin countries, as defined in La Porta et al.
2008), to total board size.
Ratio of foreign directors from common law countries to total
oard size: This is defined as the number of directors from com-
on law origin countries, as defined in La Porta et al. (2008), to
otal board size.
Ratio of indigenous high society executives to total board
ize: This is defined as the total number of directors that cur-
ently or have occupied positions of elevated social status within
ndigenous societies, namely military, governmental (including
oth secular and indigenous), university (professorial and above)
nd commercial, to total board size.
.4.  Control  variables
Five groups of controls were included in the model: industry,
oard, firm, institutional quality and ownership..4.1.  Industry  controls
Three industry controls are used. Each are dichotomous
ariables that equal 1 if the IPO firm either operates within
n extractive industry (mining, oil, oil services), finance
r
s
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financial services, banking, real estate), or technology (technol-
gy and telecommunications) and 0 otherwise. These are similar
o the industry controls used in Hearn (2012) in a study of IPO
nder-pricing in Sub Saharan African markets.
.4.2. Board  controls
.4.2.1.  Size.  Board size is defined as the total number of exec-
tive and non-executive directors and includes those designated
s executive directors in civil code markets where boards are
nitary in structure and supervisory in function. Board size
ollows Jensen (1993) who suggests that larger boards lack
ohesiveness and reduces directors’ ability to communicate and
ffectively coordinate corporate strategy thus increasing agency
osts. Smaller boards are more likely to be the result of tech-
ological and organizational change that leads to reduced costs
nd corporate downsizing. Thus, board size has an established
mpact on agency costs and asymmetric information.
.4.2.2. Independence.  Board independence is defined as the
roportion of non-executive directors to total board size. Board
ndependence follows Boyd (1994), Kosnik (1990), Westphal
nd Zajac (1994) and Conyon and Peck (1998) who claim the
ole of nonexecutives is to monitor decision-making processes
y the executives, thereby protecting minority outsider share-
older interests.
.4.3. Firm  determinants
.4.3.1.  Size.  The natural logarithm of firm revenues in the
re-IPO year in US$ was obtained from the IPO prospectus.
irm revenues are long established in the literature as a control
or the variation in size as larger firms have greater economic
rowth opportunities (Rosen, 1982; Smith and Watts, 1992).
qually the complexity of the firm’s task environment, which is
 feature of high revenue generating firms (Rosen, 1982; Smith
nd Watts, 1992) with significant growth opportunities, infers
hat managers and executive directors often have considerable
rm-specific intrinsic information which generates additional
nformation acquisition costs in communicating this to nonex-
cutives (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Coles et al., 2008) who act
n behalf of outsider shareholders.
.4.3.2.  Return  on  assets  (ROA).  Variations across the sample
n firm performance are controlled through the use of accounting
eturn on assets (calculated as ratio of earnings before tax to total
ssets and delineated ROA).
.4.4. Institutional  quality
The quality of the institutions is measured using the World
ank Governance (2011), developed by Kaufman et al. (2009).
hese are a set of six indices that capture aspects of state-level
nstitutions and citizens’ perceptions of them. These were first
onstructed in 1996, then updated every two years until 2002
nd annual thereafter. The indicators are compiled from the
esponses on the quality of governance obtained from 35 data
ources in 33 organizations and are drawn from a large sam-
le of firms, citizens and experts in industrial and emerging
ountries, with added information from institutes, think tanks,
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on-governmental organizations, and international organiza-
ions (Kaufman et al., 2009). The six indicators are constructed
sing an unobserved components methodology (see Kaufman
t al. (2009)), with values ranging from approximately −2.5
o +2.5 and where higher values denote better governance out-
omes.
The six governance indices are defined by the World Bank
World Bank Governance website, 2011) as follows:
. Voice and accountability – capturing perceptions of the extent
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in select-
ing their government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and a free media.
. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism – cap-
turing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence and terror-
ism.
. Government effectiveness – capturing perceptions of the
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
. Regulatory quality – capturing perceptions of the ability of
the government to formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permit and promote private sector devel-
opment.
. Rule of law – capturing perceptions of the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society,
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
crime and violence.
. Control of corruption – capturing perceptions of the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture
of the state by elites and private interests.
An aggregate institutional quality index was formed by first
escaling each governance indicator to fit on a scale of between
 and 10 using Eq. (1):
xjt −  Xmin
Xmin −  Xmax
)
∗  10 (2)
or indicator i in country j at time t. These were then summed
o create a single governance indicator for each country. This
ggregate institutional quality index has also been used to cap-
ure the effects on often considerable variations in institutional
uality in the recent literature on developing country IPOs by
earn (2012).
.4.5.  Ownership
The use of four ownership categories, namely foreign part-
er, family, state and corporate block shareholder is necessitated
y the need to control for each of these entities that commonly
ause ownership concentration in developing regions (La Porta
t al., 1998; Claessens et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002). These
lso account for the anticipated retained ownership in the focal
h
c
l
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PO firm which in turn is representative of the multiple agency
nfluence on each category of owner where each is subject indi-
idually to agency with their own external principals that often
ave incongruous motives (Arthurs et al., 2008).
.4.5.1. Corporate  block-shareholder.  This is the percentage
wnership of the firm pre-IPO in the form of corporate block-
hareholding entities. This takes into account the influence in
erms of governance arising from large block-shareholding enti-
ies and has been used recently in developing context by Hearn
2012).
.4.5.2.  Family.  This is the percentage ownership in the firm
re-IPO by family entities. This takes into account the influence
rising from dominant family groups with members bound by
ltruistic motives (Hearn, 2011).
.4.5.3.  State.  This is the percentage ownership in the firm
re-IPO by state entities which includes state controlled local
evelopment authorities and institutions allied or controlled to
entral government. This controls for a significant amount of
POs to have been privatizations or involving at least some
egree of state involvement.
.4.5.4.  Foreign  partner.  This is the percentage ownership in
he firm pre-IPO by foreign partner entities. Given the preva-
ence of foreign partners in internally sponsored joint venture
perations which are common in the African business environ-
ent (Boateng and Glaister, 2002), this controls for the effects
f multinational activity and influence within the sample.
.5.  Methods
Pooled cross sectional OLS regressions were used to test
hese hypotheses. These were first applied to comprehensive
frican sample and then to the two sub-samples of North Africa
nd Sub Saharan Africa. These take the form:
Log(IPO prospectus length)t =  α
+ β1 board governancet
+  β2 industry controlst
+  β3 board controlst
+  β4 firm controlst
+  β5 institutional qualityt
+  β6 ownershipt
+  εi
(3)
here Log (IPO prospectus length) relates to the natural log-
rithm of IPO prospectus page length, in number of pages.
oard governance is formed of the three variables central to the
ypotheses, namely ratio of foreign directors from civil code law
ountries to board size, ratio of foreign directors from common
aw countries to board size and ratio of indigenous high society
irectors (director’s also carrying elevated social status roles in
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inter-country heterogeneity in institutions. Equally following
the addition of the ratio of social elites to board size variable,
two control variables grow in absolute size and attain statisticalB. Hearn / Review of Devel
ndigenous society such as military, academic, governmental) to
otal board size. All other control variables are defined as earlier.
First a regression model is run with only control variables,
mitting the board governance variables detailed in hypotheses.
hen each of the board governance variables is added recursively
o the model containing the controls before a grand regression
s run containing all board governance variables together along-
ide the controls. Finally to account for potential heterogeneity
cross countries, country fixed effects are applied to the grand
egression model.
.  Results
.1.  Descriptive  statistics
The evidence from Table 1 reveals considerable differences in
PO prospectus page length alongside numbers of true indepen-
ent nonexecutives, foreign and high society directors as well
s levels of contract enforcement across African countries and
egions. Generally North and Southern African regions have the
argest prospectuses, with the mean across firms in South Africa
eing 203.75 pages, Namibia being 162 pages, Botswana being
14 pages while those in Egypt being 150.78 pages, Morocco
eing 189.03 pages and Tunisia being 191.83 pages. However
here is considerable intra-regional variation with the market
evel mean across Southern African IPO firms in Mauritius being
7 pages, and Mozambique being 34 pages. Country level aver-
ges of IPO firms in East Africa range from 105.5 pages in
anzania to 158 pages in Kenya while the lowest values are
n West Africa with Nigeria mean IPO prospectus length being
6.65 pages, Ghana being 86.50 pages, although the Cape Verde
slands is a notable exception in West Africa with market mean
rospectus length being 170.50 pages. It is notable that corpo-
ate governance legislation and securities market regulation in
ape Verde is significantly influenced by that in Portugal (BVC
ebsite, 2011).
The market level mean gross proceeds raised by IPO firms is
enerally reflective of the size of the markets with the largest and
ost active markets across the continent, namely South Africa,
igeria, Kenya, Egypt and Morocco having the highest mean
evels. However this trend is not indicative of IPO expenses,
hich includes all costs associated with the IPO and issuance
f stock including auditing and accounting fees, underwriter
osts as well as documentation and legal fees. Generally mean
PO expenses are highest between Uganda (US$ 12,920), Egypt
US$ 15,240), South Africa (US$ 11,150) and Malawi (US$
4,400). Equally there is considerable variation in institutional
uality across the continent although generally the countries of
orth and Southern African regions have the highest overall
nstitutional quality. Prominent exceptions are Algeria in North
frica, as well as Mozambique and Malawi in Southern Africa,
here overall institutional quality is notably lower than that of
eighbouring regional countries. Finally while East and West
frican regions are marked by low institutional quality two
otable exceptions are Ghana and Cape Verde Islands where
his is on a level with developed Southern and North African
ountries.
N
i
rnt Finance 3 (2013) 84–98 91
.2.  Impact  of  board  governance  attributes  on  IPO  ﬁrm
rospectus length
The study of regression residuals did not reveal any
ssues regarding either heteroskedasticity or non-Normality in
istributions while minimal correlation between variables miti-
ates concerns regarding multicollinearity.2 The evidence from
able 2 reveals a mixed level of support for all three hypothe-
es H1–H3 in the pan-African sample of IPOs. The evidence
rom model 2, where ratio of civil code law directors to board
ize was included on its own alongside the controls, as well as
rom the grand regression model 5 reveal a negative relationship
nd statistically significant (over 95% confidence level) between
roportion of civil code law directors on the board to the natu-
al logarithm of IPO prospectus size. However the inclusion of
his variable only accounts for a meagre increase in explanatory
ower over consideration of control variables on their own (in
odel 1) of 0.24%.
Equally following the application of fixed effects in model 6
he relationship loses its statistical significance at any discern-
ble confidence level. Overall the evidence provides marginal
upport for hypothesis H1. In contrast the relationship between
atio of common law directors to board size and the IPO prospec-
us size lacks any statistical significance at any discernable
onfidence level in the individual model 3 and its grand regres-
ion counterpart, model 5. However following the application
f country fixed effects this relationship is large, positive and
cquires statistical significance at the 90% confidence level
nferring some support for hypothesis H2 once the effects of het-
rogeneity across countries is taken into account. The evidence
n relation to hypothesis H3 is more contradictory in nature. The
elationship between ratio of social elite (high society) directors
o board size and IPO prospectus length is persistently negative
cross all models, namely model 4 where it is included individ-
ally alongside controls, the grand regression model 5 and the
rand regression model following application of country fixed
ffects in model 6. However while this relationship has a sta-
istical significance of just below the 90% confidence level the
nclusion of this variable has a substantial impact on explanatory
ower. Its individual addition to model 5 causes an increase in
xplanatory power of 11.56% over and above that for the control
ariables on their own (model 1). This infers some support for
ypothesis H3.
Generally the explanatory power of all models is high
lthough the largest increases in this are firstly following the
ddition of the ratio of social elite (high society) directors
nd then a second jump in R2 occurs following the applica-
ion of country fixed effects to take account of unobservable2 Pearson correlation results for the three samples, namely Africa and then
orth and Sub Saharan Africa, reveal minimal correlation and statistical signif-
cance of correlations between variables. These are available from author upon
equest.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for IPO prospectus length, board characteristics and ownership of IPO firms IPO prospectus length is defined as total number of pages making
up the last issued prospectus of firm immediately preceding IPO.
IPO prospectus length IPO gross proceeds (US$ ‘000) IPO expenses (US$ ‘000) Institutional quality index
Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev.
North Africa
Algeria 48.67 50.00 3.21 9143 6322 10,802 – – – 1.593 1.534 0.102
Egypt 150.78 194.00 115.36 1,007,074 237,439 2,384,298 15.24 16.56 12.57 2.537 2.536 0.130
Morocco 189.03 188.00 62.14 84,588 16,311 180,928 2.37 1.54 1.94 2.930 2.941 0.102
Tunisia 191.83 165.50 130.43 18,070 6095 28,062 – – – 3.215 3.240 0.085
West Africa
BRVM/Cote d’Ivoire 38.60 34.00 16.89 14,044 1176 28,806 – – – 1.860 2.080 0.304
Cameroon 86.50 86.50 47.38 18,739 18,739 17,721 2.02 2.02 2.82 2.278 2.278 0.000
Cape Verde Islands 170.50 169.50 35.26 5194 2893 5124 – – – 3.644 3.502 0.283
Ghana 71.64 75.00 25.74 9217 1942 17,102 4.94 4.14 4.02 3.163 3.256 0.315
Nigeria 46.65 44.50 23.92 164,878 119,914 183,807 5.04 5.00 1.36 1.762 1.835 0.266
East Africa
Kenya 158.00 148.00 47.39 117,872 48,116 197,521 6.30 5.10 3.49 2.468 2.462 0.016
Uganda 121.00 130.00 50.80 13,950 6500 18,859 12.92 6.42 18.20 2.244 2.212 0.311
Tanzania 105.50 111.00 32.76 17,290 11,136 17,648 5.05 1.85 7.77 2.810 2.938 0.240
Southern Africa
Mauritius 47.00 47.00 0.00 7129 7129 0 7.28 7.28 0.00 4.227 4.227 0.00
Mozambique 34.00 34.00 0.00 18,349 18,349 0 – – – 2.723 2.723 0.00
Botswana 114.00 68.00 106.79 31,312 30,699 28,347 4.12 4.94 2.27 4.259 4.251 0.092
Malawi 93.50 97.00 7.72 16,797 12,061 18,119 14.40 9.61 11.77 2.700 2.848 0.361
Namibia 162.00 162.00 16.97 12,487 12,487 10,411 1.95 1.95 2.75 3.877 3.877 0.226
Zambia 48.67 40.50 32.05 29,842 9347 51,272 4.53 1.47 6.89 2.665 2.707 0.332
South Africa 203.75 153.50 146.85 254,654 80,623 407,917 11.15 11.73 10.77 3.730 3.728 0.165
Legal regime
Civil code law 162.14 166.00 98.22 169,682.58 12,851.00 879,559.97 4.32 1.59 6.58 2.880 2.941 0.499
03.65
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otes: The data have been sourced manually from the last prospectus lodged wi
ignificance. These are a positive relationship between board
ize and IPO prospectus length which lacks statistical signifi-
ance at any discernable confidence level and attains significance
t 99–90% confidence and a positive relationship between state
wnership control (pre-IPO) and the dependent variable which
ttains statistical significance at 90% confidence level. This
ehaviour amongst these variables would underscore the evi-
ence from Joireman (2001, 2006) and North (1989) regarding
he narrowness of political economies in Africa and domination
f these by social elites. The relationship between IPO prospec-
us length and board size also infers that firms with larger boards
re more likely to disclose more. This is intuitively unexpected
iven the evidence in literature that larger boards are more likely
ssociated with paucity in director communication and coordi-
ation leading to a poorer information quality environment (see
ermalin and Weisbach, 2003 and Jensen, 1993 for example).
owever this finding may be consistent with evidence from
ope (2003) that disclosures are generally more important in
usiness environments and firms characterized by low analyst
ollowing, i.e. paucity in informational environment which is
haracterized both by large boards and particularly the role of
arge boards in the context of wider institutional deficiencies
uch as those common across Africa.
More generally there is a persistent positive and
ighly statistically significant relationship between Technol-
gy/Telecommunications industry control and IPO prospectus
ength which retains statistical significance, size and direction
s
I
t 160,098.46 6.25 4.97 6.87 2.608 2.498 0.790
 relevant securities exchange or national regulator immediately prior to listing.
ollowing application of country fixed effects. A similar positive
elationship is observed between extractive industry controls but
nly following the application of country fixed effects. The per-
istent large, negative and statistically significant relationship
etween natural logarithm of firm revenues and IPO prospec-
us length fits with evidence from the literature where more
omplex task environments and growth opportunities incen-
ivizes informational disclosure (Rosen, 1982; Smith and Watts,
992). However a larger negative and generally statistically
ignificant relationship between the firm performance term,
ccounting return on assets (ROA), infers that the amount of
rm disclosure is more highly correlated to larger firms with
ore complex task environments but with lower levels of finan-
ial performance. In terms of institutional quality and there is
 persistent large positive relationship between this and IPO
rospectus length across all models (model 1–5) at 99–95%
onfidence level which loses its statistical significance consider-
bly following the application of country fixed effects that take
ccount of unobserved heterogeneity across countries. However
ollowing the application of country fixed effects the statistical
ignificance is only marginally below the 90% confidence level
nferring that even after unobserved differences across countries
re taken into account that the overall quality of institutions is
n important factor. Finally there is a positive and statistically
ignificant relationship between family ownership (pre-IPO) and
PO prospectus length across all models inferring some informa-
ional disclosure benefits for minority external investors arising
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Table 2
The impact of board governance on IPO prospectus size for Africa regression models are pooled cross section OLS regressions relating control variables and board
characteristics to natural logarithm of IPO prospectus length (pages). Board governance, economic determinants and ownership variables are as defined in Table 2.
Log (IPO prospectus number of pages)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 2.174 (6.07)†† 2.250 (6.27)†† 2.173 (6.03)†† 2.191 (7.34)†† 2.322 (7.39)†† 3.240 (4.49)††
Board governance
Ratio foreign
director civil law
−0.551 (−1.93)** −0.771 (−2.32)† −0.040 (−0.08)
Ratio foreign
director common
law
−0.007 (−0.03) −0.041 (−0.19) 0.523 (1.57)*
Ratio social elites −0.500 (−1.08) −0.614 (−1.21) −0.174 (−0.59)
Industry controls
Technol-
ogy/telecom
industry
0.210 (1.97)** 0.205 (1.96)** 0.210 (2.00)** 0.232 (2.65)† 0.223 (2.62)† 0.194 (1.75)**
Extract industry −0.060 (−0.25) −0.065 (−0.28) −0.060 (−0.25) 0.097 (0.55) 0.092 (0.48) 0.164 (1.31)*
Financials industry −0.113 (−0.63) −0.148 (−0.77) −0.113 (−0.62) 0.120 (0.85) 0.087 (0.58) 0.112 (1.12)
Board controls
Board size 0.005 (0.16) 0.006 (0.22) 0.005 (0.16) 0.029 (2.53)† 0.031 (2.53)† 0.024 (2.13)**
Board ind. ratio −0.004 (−0.20) −0.004 (−0.24) −0.004 (−0.21) −0.002 (−0.11) −0.001 (−0.05) −0.009 (−0.80)
Firm controls
Log (revenue) 0.091 (4.19)†† 0.085 (3.71)†† 0.091 (4.06)†† 0.084 (4.70)†† 0.078 (4.15)†† 0.069 (2.46)††
ROA −0.698 (−1.53)* −0.848 (−1.76)** −0.697 (−1.45)* −0.562 (−1.09) −0.745 (−1.37)* −0.609 (−1.44)*
Institutional controls
Institutional quality
index
0.507 (5.39)†† 0.511 (5.51)†† 0.507 (5.33)†† 0.458 (5.03)†† 0.458 (5.09)†† 0.185 (0.68)
Ownership
Corp. block own 0.003 (1.03) 0.003 (1.07) 0.003 (1.04) 0.001 (0.38) 0.001 (0.44) −0.0003 (−0.23)
Family own 0.003 (1.58)* 0.003 (1.48)* 0.003 (1.56)* 0.004 (3.13)†† 0.004 (2.90)†† 0.001 (0.91)
State own 0.001 (0.27) 0.001 (0.24) 0.001 (0.27) 0.003 (1.10) 0.003 (1.28)* 0.002 (1.33)*
Foreign partner
own
−0.004 (−1.50)* −0.004 (−1.13) −0.004 (−1.37)* −0.005 (−1.69)** −0.004 (−0.97) −0.007 (−1.82)**
Country fixed effects No No No No No Yes
F-test 4.375 (0.00) 4.158 (0.00) 4.007 (0.00) 6.299 (0.00) 5.757 (0.00) 8.119 (0.00)
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139
Adjusted R2 0.2269 0.2293 0.2207 0.3346 0.3425 0.6316
Adjusted R2 (over
control variables
only)
0.0024 −0.0062 0.1077 0.1156 0.4047
Notes: (1) T-statistics are in parentheses. (2) White cross-section standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected).
Bold indicates value is greater than zero.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
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rom family control and influence. However a similarly sized
egative relationship between foreign partner ownership (pre-
PO) and IPO prospectus length is as intuitively expected as this
nfers that the multinational enterprises (MNEs) involved in the
oint ventures with local subsidiary firms are more likely to pre-
er financing from internal means rather than to resort to local
xternal capital markets. As such this minimal interest in local
xternal capital markets is reflected in antipathy towards costly
nd revealing information disclosures in the form of larger IPO
rospectuses.
The evidence relating to the two sub-samples of Sub Saharan
frica and North Africa are between Tables 3 and 4, respec-
ively. These reveal considerable differences between the two
frican sub-regions. In particular following the disaggregation
l
s
If the pan-African sample a similar disaggregation in effects can
e seen too. The evidence from the Sub Saharan African (SSA)
ub sample (in Table 3) reveals the slight relationship between
he ratios of foreign directors from civil code law and com-
on law countries to board size where the latter is negatively
elated to IPO prospectus length until the application of coun-
ry fixed effects whereupon this relationship loses its statistical
ignificance.
However the relationship between the latter variable, ratio of
ommon law foreign directors to board size, and IPO prospectus
ength is positive and statistically significant at 90% confidence
evel across models 9 and 11 and retains its size, direction and
ignificance even after the application of country fixed effects.
t is notable that the increase in explanatory power from the
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Table 3
The impact of board governance on IPO prospectus size for Sub Saharan Africa regression models are pooled cross section OLS regressions relating control variables
and board characteristics to natural logarithm of IPO prospectus length (pages). Board governance, economic determinants and ownership variables are as defined
in Table 2.
Log (IPO prospectus number of pages)
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Intercept 2.157 (3.27)†† 2.199 (3.53)†† 2.234 (3.93)†† 2.157 (3.25)†† 2.235 (3.81)†† 3.421 (5.67)††
Board governance
Ratio foreign
director civil law
−0.654 (−2.48)† −0.512 (−2.71)†† 0.235 (0.53)
Ratio foreign
director common
law
0.523 (1.82)** 0.304 (1.28)* 0.818 (1.50)*
Ratio social elites 0.020 (0.04) −0.154 (−0.26) −0.025 (−0.07)
Industry controls
Technol-
ogy/telecom
industry
0.249 (1.28)* 0.252 (1.37)* 0.290 (1.64)* 0.251 (1.15) 0.264 (1.37)* 0.481 (3.27)††
Extract industry 0.016 (0.08) 0.020 (0.09) 0.073 (0.38) 0.015 (0.07) 0.061 (0.26) 0.207 (1.19)
Financials industry 0.191 (1.26) 0.193 (1.33)* 0.231 (1.54)* 0.188 (1.01) 0.236 (1.29)* 0.080 (0.54)
Board controls
Board size 0.015 (0.72) 0.018 (0.90) 0.018 (0.88) 0.015 (0.67) 0.018 (0.80) 0.014 (0.64)
Board ind. ratio −0.002 (−0.01) 0.006 (0.02) 0.011 (0.03) −0.009 (−0.02) 0.068 (0.16) −0.108 (−0.46)
Firm controls
Log (revenue) 0.069 (2.30)** 0.061 (2.07)** 0.057 (1.91)** 0.069 (2.18)** 0.059 (1.87)** 0.021 (0.50)
ROA 0.280 (0.88) 0.391 (0.92) 0.210 (0.62) 0.280 (0.86) 0.322 (0.75) −0.741 (−1.68)**
Institutional controls
Institutional quality
index
0.384 (3.72)†† 0.383 (3.68)†† 0.369 (3.79)†† 0.385 (3.49)†† 0.369 (3.36)†† 0.175 (0.76)
Ownership
Corp. block own 0.001 (0.19) 0.001 (0.36) −0.0004 (−0.15) 0.001 (0.19) 0.0002 (0.07) 0.001 (0.25)
Family own 0.003 (1.05) 0.003 (1.09) 0.003 (1.10) 0.003 (1.02) 0.003 (1.06) 0.007 (2.23)**
State own 0.007 (2.08)** 0.007 (2.09)** 0.008 (2.48)† 0.007 (1.70)** 0.008 (2.16)** 0.003 (1.68)**
Foreign partner
own
−0.001 (−0.22) 0.0001 (0.03) −0.002 (−0.56) −0.001 (−0.20) −0.001 (−0.23) −0.006 (−1.53)*
Country fixed effects No No No No No Yes
F-test 2.685 (0.00) 2.719 (0.00) 2.690 (0.00) 2.441 (0.00) 2.358 (0.00) 3.817 (0.00)
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80
Adjusted R2 0.2038 0.2205 0.2175 0.1917 0.2050 0.5084
Adjusted R2 (over
control variables
only)
0.0167 0.0137 −0.0121 0.0012 0.3046
Notes: (1) T-statistics are in parentheses. (2) White cross-section standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected).
Bold indicates value is greater than zero.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
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wo models (model 8 and 9, respectively) arising from the indi-
idual addition of ratio of foreign civil code law as opposed to
oreign common law directors to board size over and above that
ttributable to the controls on their own is 1.67% and 1.37%.
his infers some support for hypotheses H1 and H2. In contrast
o the earlier pan-African sample group there is a total lack
f statistical significance at any discernable confidence level
etween the ratio of social elites (high society) to board size
nd IPO prospectus length. This infers a lack of any support
or the role of social elites (high society) directors in enhanced
nformation disclosure within Sub Saharan African region. More
enerally across the control variables and there is a large, positive
nd statistically significant relationship between both financials
m
t
ts well as technology/telecommunications industry control and
PO prospectus length. There is a generally positive and statisti-
ally significant relationship between natural logarithm of firm
evenue and IPO prospectus length inferring firm size and com-
lexity of operating (task) environment is a factor in determining
mount of disclosure. However the relationship between firm
erformance (ROA) generally lacks statistical significance until
he application of country fixed effects which is in contrast to
he larger pan-African sample. The aggregate institutional qual-
ty control is large, positive and statistically significant across allodels 7–11 until the application of country fixed effects when
he relationship loses its significance, although this is just below
he 90% confidence level inferring some residual importance of
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Table 4
The impact of board governance on IPO prospectus size for North Africa regression models are pooled cross section OLS regressions relating control variables and
board characteristics to natural logarithm of IPO prospectus length (pages). Board governance, economic determinants and ownership variables are as defined in
Table 2.
Log (IPO prospectus number of pages)
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Intercept 1.055 (1.03) 1.063 (1.03) 1.138 (1.14) 2.071 (2.89)†† 2.130 (2.82)†† 1.327 (0.58)
Board governance
Ratio foreign
director civil law
−0.175 (−0.31) −0.205 (−0.43) −0.316 (−0.60)
Ratio foreign
director common
law
−0.521 (−0.82) −0.210 (−0.52) −0.242 (−0.66)
Ratio social elites 0.441 (0.70) 0.500 (0.74) 0.332 (0.67)
Industry controls
Technol-
ogy/telecom
industry
0.110 (0.59) 0.107 (0.57) 0.103 (0.55) 0.204 (1.75)** 0.194 (1.61)* 0.124 (1.05)
Extract industry −0.110 (−0.30) −0.112 (−0.30) −0.114 (−0.30) 0.196 (1.11) 0.192 (1.02) 0.188 (1.05)
Financials industry −0.289 (−0.53) −0.306 (−0.55) −0.274 (−0.51) 0.329 (2.42)† 0.308 (2.12)** 0.261 (1.71)**
Board controls
Board size −0.023 (−0.49) −0.023 (−0.48) −0.026 (−0.53) 0.038 (3.60)†† 0.038 (3.23)†† 0.043 (3.83)††
Board ind. ratio 0.073 (0.22) 0.072 (0.21) 0.063 (0.19) −0.195 (−1.02) −0.198 (−1.01) −0.301 (−1.47)*
Firm controls
Log (revenue) 0.137 (3.96)†† 0.137 (3.94)†† 0.131 (3.68)†† 0.116 (2.97)†† 0.112 (2.72)†† 0.089 (1.78)**
ROA −1.052 (−1.15) −1.100 (−1.16) −1.165 (−1.26) −0.571 (−0.72) −0.673 (−0.83) −0.600 (−0.69)
Institutional controls
Institutional quality
index
0.993 (2.87)†† 0.997 (2.85)†† 1.006 (2.88)†† 0.582 (3.36)†† 0.591 (3.45)†† 0.952 (1.34)*
Ownership
Corp. block own 0.001 (0.28) 0.001 (0.28) 0.001 (0.28) −0.003 (−1.76)** −0.003 (−1.72)** −0.003 (−1.49)*
Family own −0.002 (−0.80) −0.002 (−0.82) −0.002 (−0.84) −0.001 (−0.82) −0.001 (−0.93) −0.001 (−0.98)
State own 1.06E-04 (0.04) 3.00E-05 (0.01) 1.52E-04 (0.05) −0.004 (−1.22) −0.004 (−1.23) −0.002 (−1.28)*
Foreign partner
own
0.006 (0.38) 0.007 (0.39) 0.009 (0.48) −0.015 (−3.62)†† −0.013 (−2.62)†† −0.012 (−2.03)**
Country fixed effects No No No No No Yes
F-test 1.752 (0.00) 1.587 (0.00) 1.618 (0.00) 4.424 (0.00) 3.708 (0.00) 3.372 (0.00)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60
Adjusted R2 0.1308 0.1129 0.1181 0.4300 0.4077 0.4198
Adjusted R2 (over
control variables
only)
−0.0179 −0.0127 0.2992 0.2769 0.2890
Notes: (1) T-statistics are in parentheses. (2) White cross-section standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected).
Bold indicates value is greater than zero.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
† p < 0.01.
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nstitutional differences across sample group countries. In terms
f ownership controls and pre-IPO state ownership has a posi-
ive and statistically significant relationship with IPO prospectus
ength underlining the importance of the role of the state in priva-
izations across the SSA regions capital markets. However only
fter the application of country fixed effects does a positive rela-
ionship between family ownership and IPO prospectus length
nd a negative relationship between foreign partner (MNE)
wnership and IPO prospectus length attain statistical signif-
cance. It is notable that following the application of country
xed effects to take account of unobserved heterogeneity across
ountries that the explanatory power of the model increases to
i
h
vver 30% from that of the model 7 where only the controls are
ncluded with no country effects.
The evidence from the North African sub-sample (in Table 4)
eveals a general lack of any credible support for hypothe-
es H1 and H2. However as in the case of the earlier larger
an-African sample, there is a similar lack of statistical sig-
ificance at 90% confidence level in the relationship between
atio of social elite (high society) directors to board size and
PO prospectus length while this relationship is positive which
s inconsistent with the anticipated direction of relationship in
ypothesis H3. Furthermore the inclusion of this variable indi-
idually in model 16 causes a dramatic increase in explanatory
9 opme
p
i
t
n
I
s
A
a
t
c
c
o
e
l
w
(
o
m
e
i
t
k
T
b
p
I
s
s
b
c
r
l
f
s
p
n
s
i
(
b
q
(
s
w
i
t
m
e
w
i
N
i
l
S
i
t
t
p
i
i
c
a
5
g
t
a
o
o
m
r
t
a
i
i
t
a
t
c
w
p
s
N
u
w
r
e
g
v
t
d
e
i
f
l
i
t
i
i
t
c
i
r
t
n
g
n6 B. Hearn / Review of Devel
ower over and above that attributable for controls of 29.92%
nferring some importance for the ratio of social elites within
he board in terms of information disclosures. One likely expla-
ation of this positive relationship between social elites and
PO prospectus length, in terms of increased information disclo-
ure, is that the business and institutional environment of North
frica is fundamentally different from that in SSA. In particular
 greater concern for investors in the North African region is
he separation of ownership (cash flow rights of the firm) from
ontrol (voting rights) which is especially prevalent in family
ontrolled or influenced firms often inducing the extensive use
f cross-shareholdings between associate or related firms and
xtended pyramidal networks (Claessens et al., 2000). In particu-
ar the separation of ownership from control is closely associated
ith enhanced ability of families to engage in expropriation
Claessens et al., 1999). In this light the increasing presence
f social elites on boards within the North African region are
ore likely to both signal quality to investors, through social
lites connection to secular governmental institutions, as well as
n their promotion of enhanced information disclosure through
heir desire to attract foreign investment given the regions mar-
ets close proximity to Europe (Hearn and Piesse, 2010a,b).
hese arguments are also reflected in terms of the relationships
etween the controls and IPO prospectus length where there is a
ersistent negative relationship between family ownership (pre-
PO) and IPO prospectus length although this only just lacks
tatistical significance at the 90% confidence level. The inclu-
ion of the ratio of social elites to board size variable also causes
oard size to attain a positive and highly statistically signifi-
ant relationship at 99–95% confidence level and the negative
elationship between board independence ratio and prospectus
ength to attain statistical significance at 90% confidence level
ollowing application of country fixed effects. Equally the inclu-
ion of ratio of social elites to board size variable causes the
ositive relationship between IPO prospectus length and tech-
ology/telecommunication industry control to attain statistical
ignificance as well as between prospectus length and financial
ndustry which attains a high degree of statistical significance
over 99% confidence level). It is notable that the relationship
etween IPO prospectus length and the aggregate institutional
uality measure is positive and highly statistically significant
over 99–95% confidence level) for all models and retains its
ignificance following application of country fixed effects. This
ould underscore the relative importance of institutional quality
n the North African region in contrast to its SSA counterpart in
erms of the impact of institutions in safeguarding an environ-
ent for external finance. The combination of narrow political
conomies and small formal economic sectors in SSA markets
ould infer that the impact of institutional quality in safeguard-
ng external finance is not as great as that in the more developed
orth African region. Finally the differences in direction aris-
ng in relationship between state ownership and IPO prospectus
ength, where this is negative in North Africa and positive in
SA, underscores the differences in role of state and its role
n financial markets between the two sub-regions. In particular
his would underscore the very different role and incentives of
he state between the two regions in promoting disclosure and
n
fi
t
rnt Finance 3 (2013) 84–98
rotecting information acquisition by minority outsider
nvestors where the role of the state is more likely in SSA
n response to privatization initiatives by international finan-
ial institutions with the ostensible development policy goal of
ttracting more foreign outsider minority investment.
.  Conclusions
This study performs a unique analysis into the board level
overnance determinants of the length of IPO listings prospec-
uses across a comprehensive sample of 165 IPO firms from
cross the African continent between 2000 and 2011. The length
f IPO listings prospectuses is a social construct and the product
f the national formal institutional environment and enforce-
ent mechanisms as well as more pervasive informal institutions
eflected in the cognitive decision processes of individual direc-
ors and in particular nonexecutives charged with monitoring
nd ensuring informational transparency for external minority
nvestors.
After controlling for a variety of firm-level, ownership and
nstitutional controls I find evidence of significant differences in
he impact of the proportion of directors that are from civil code
s opposed to common law countries of origin on IPO prospec-
us length. Increasing proportions of foreign directors from civil
ode law countries is inversely related to IPO prospectus length
hile the opposite effect is found for their common law counter-
arts. While these relationships are found in the overall African
ample they also hold across SSA but are notably absent in the
orth African sub sample. It is likely that a combination of small
nderdeveloped markets for external finance in SSA together
ith an often incongruous and unsupportive institutional envi-
onment accentuate the contrasting impact of directors from
ither civil or common law backgrounds. This is especially likely
iven the prevalence of foreign directors associated with joint
entures between local firms and foreign partners in SSA, a fea-
ure that is rare in North Africa, and the importance of foreign
irectors in signalling high quality to external investors. How-
ver in contrast to the lack of importance of foreign directors
n the North African region, increasing proportions of directors
rom social elites is positively associated with IPO prospectus
ength. The impact of social elite directors in SSA by compar-
son is insignificant. There are two possible explanations for
he increasing IPO prospectus length and amount of disclosure
n relation to increasing proportions of social elites on board
n North Africa. The first relates to the importance of reputa-
ion and disclosure within classical Islamic contracting which is
entred on the notion of partnership and which underscores the
nformal institutions and societal matrices across the Maghreb
egion. However the second is more plausible in relating to
he Maghreb region being dominated by large extended family
etworks with control vested in state machinery, such as polity,
overnmental, legal and judicial bureaucracy, as well as busi-
ess environment. These extend their control through pyramidal
etworks and extensive cross shareholding between affiliated
rms resulting in considerable separation of ownership and con-
rol. In the light of this dominant governance model across the
egion there are considerable incentives in attracting minority
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xternal investors given the formidable potential for expropria-
ion through this governance mechanism.
cknowledgments
I am grateful to Lilian de Menezes for Portuguese to English
ranslation of Cape Verde Islands and Mozambican prospec-
uses as well as Nadia Oumalik and Olive Kone for assistance
ith French translation of BRVM (Cote d’Ivoire), Cameroo-
ian, Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian prospectuses as well as
eorges Selim for Arabic translation of three Egyptian prospec-
uses. I am also very grateful for useful comments from the
articipants of the Academy of International Business (UK
nd Ireland Chapter) annual conference, Trinity College Dublin
reland March 2010, Academy of International Business annual
onference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil June 2010 and the Asian
inancial Association Conference, Hong Kong July 2010.
eferences
frican Financial website, 2011. African Financial Statements and Annual
Reports. www.africanfinancials.com (accessed 15.09.11).
kerloff, G.A., Dickens, W.T., 1982. The Economic Consequences of Cognitive
Dissonance. The American Economic Review 72 (3), 307–319.
rmstrong, C.S., Guay, W.R., Weber, J.P., 2010. The role of Information and
financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 50 (2), 179–234.
rmstrong, C.S., Core, J.E., Taylor, D.J., Verrecchia, R.E., 2011. When does
information asymmetry affect the cost of capital? Journal of Accounting
Research 49 (1), 1–40.
rthurs, J., Hoskisson, R., Busenitz, L., Johnson, R., 2008. Managerial agents
watching other agents: multiple agency conflicts regarding underpricing in
IPO firms. Academy of Management Journal 51, 277–294.
BC news, 2011. Arab Spring may not Lessen West’s Influence.
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13261141 (accessed 15.06.11).
eattie, V., Jones, M.J., 2001. A six country comparison of the use of graphs in
annual reports. International Journal of Accounting 36, 195–222.
oateng, A., Glaister, K.W., 2002. Performance of international joint ventures:
evidence for West Africa. International Business Review 11, 523–541.
oulton, T.J., Smart, S.B., Zutter, C.J., 2009. IPO underpricing and international
corporate governance. Journal of International Business Studies 19, 1–17.
oyd, B.K., 1994. Board control and CEO compensation. Strategic Management
Journal 15 (5), 335–344.
rav, A., Gompers, P.A., 2003. The role of lockups in initial public offerings.
Review of Financial Studies 16 (1), 1–29.
ruton, G.D., Filatotchev, I., Chahine, S., Wright, M., 2010. Governance, owner-
ship structure and performance of IPO firms: The impact of different types
of private equity investors and legal institutions in two European nations.
Strategic Management Journal 31, 491–509.
VC website, http://www.bvc.cv/ (accessed 10.06.11).
laessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J.H., Lang, L.H.P., 1999. Expropriation of
Minority Shareholders. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS
2088. World Bank, Washington.
laessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H.P., 2000. The separation of ownership
and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58,
81–112.
offee, J., 2000. Privatization and corporate governance: the lessons from secu-
rities market failure. Working paper no. 158. Columbia Law School, New
York.
oles, J.L., Daniel, N.D., Naveen, L., 2008. Boards: does one size fit all? Journal
of Financial Economics 87, 329–356.onyon, M.J., Peck, S.I., 1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and
top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal 41 (2),
146–157.
Lnt Finance 3 (2013) 84–98 97
ottle, S., Murray, R., Block, F., 1989. Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis,
5th ed. McGraw-Hill, New York.
emsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership. Journal of
Political Economy 93, 1155–1177.
SX website, 2010. Douala Stock Exchange.
www.douala-stock-exchange.com/index fr.php (accessed 15.09.11).
ama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal
of Law and Economics 26, 301–325.
an, J.P.H., Wong, T.J., 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the infor-
mativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 33, 401–425.
ogarty, T.J., Rogers, R.K., 2005. Financial analysts reports: an extended
institutional theory evaluation. Accounting, Organizations and Society 30,
331–356.
ood, P.I., Hardin, J.W., 2009. Common Errors in Statistics (And How to Avoid
Them), 3rd ed. Wiley, Hoboken, NJ.
ray, S.J., 1988. Towards a theory of cultural influence on the development of
accounting systems internationally. Abacus 24 (1), 1–15.
anley, K.W., Hoberg, G., 2010. The information content of IPO prospectuses.
Review of Financial Studies 23, 2821–2864.
earn, B., 2011. The performance and the effects of family control in North
African IPOs. International Review of Financial Analysis 20, 140–151.
earn, B., 2012. The contrasting effects of board composition and structure
on IPO firm underpricing in a developing context. International Review of
Financial Analysis 21, 33–44.
earn, B., 2013. The institutional determinants of IPO firm prospectus length
in a developing context: a research note. Research in International Business
and Finance 27, 52–65.
earn, B., Piesse, J., 2009. Sector level cost of equity in African financial
markets. Emerging Markets Review 10, 257–278.
earn, B., Piesse, J., 2010a. Barriers to the development of small stock mar-
kets: a case study of Swaziland and Mozambique. Journal of International
Development 22, 1018–1037.
earn, B., Piesse, J., 2010b. Modelling size and illiquidity in West African
equity markets. Applied Financial Economics 22, 1–20.
ermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 2003. Boards of directors as an endogenously
determined institution: a survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy
Review 9, 7–26.
ofstede, G., 1980. Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Related Values. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA.
ope, O.-K., 2003. Firm-level disclosures and the relative roles of culture and
legal origin. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting
14 (3), 218–248.
ensen, M.C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of
internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48, 831–880.
ensen, M.C., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior,
agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3,
305–360.
oireman, S.F., 2001. Inherited legal systems and effective rule of law: Africa
and the colonial legacy. Journal of Modern African Studies 39 (4), 571–596.
oireman, S.F., 2006. The evolution of the common law: legal develop-
ment in Kenya and India. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 21,
190–210.
ahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1982. Conflict resolution: a cognitive perspective.
In: Arrow, K.J. (Ed.), Barriers to Conflict Resolution. Cambridge University
Press, New York.
aufman, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2009. Governance Matters VIII: Gov-
ernance Indicators for 1996–2008. World Bank Policy Research Unit.
enny, C.J., Moss, T.J., 1998. Stock markets in Africa: emerging lions or white
elephants? World Development 26 (5), 829–843.
osnik, R., 1990. Effects of board demography and director’s incentives on cor-
porate greenmail decisions. Academy of Management Journal 33, 129–150.
uran, T., 2004. Why the Middle East is economically underdeveloped: histori-
cal mechanisms of institutional stagnation. Journal of Economic Perspectivesangevoort, D.C., 1998. Behavioral theories of judgment and decision making
in legal scholarship: A literature review. Vanderbilt Law Review 51 (6),
1499–1550.
9 opme
L
L
L
L
L
L
M
N
N
N
N
R
R
S
S
S
S
W
W8 B. Hearn / Review of Devel
a Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schliefer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law and
finance. Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113–1155.
a Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership
around the World. Journal of Finance 54, 471–518.
a Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schliefer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Investor
protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics 58,
3–27.
a Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2008. The economic conse-
quences of legal origins. Journal of Economic Literature 46, 285–332.
avelle, K., 2001. Architecture of equity markets: the Abidjan Regional bourse.
International Organization 55, 717–742.
i, F., 2008. Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persis-
tence. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 45,
221–247.
ueller, G., Gernon, H., Meek, G., 1991. Accounting – An International Per-
spective, 2nd ed. Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood.
obes, C.W., 1983. A judgemental international classification of financial
reporting practices. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 10 (1),
1–19.orth, D., 1989. Institutions and economic growth: an historical introduction.
World Development 17 (9), 1319–1332.
orth, D., 1990. A transaction cost theory of politics. Journal of Theoretical
Politics 2 (4), 355–367.
Wnt Finance 3 (2013) 84–98
orth, D.C., 1991. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1), 97–112.
osen, S., 1982. Authority, control, and the distribution of earnings. Bell Journal
of Economics 13 (2), 311–323.
ossouw, G.J., 2009. Business, ethics and corporate governance in Africa.
Business and Society 44 (1), 94–106.
mith, C.W., Watts, R.L., 1992. The investment opportunity set and corpo-
rate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial
Economics 32, 263–292.
oltani, B., 2002. Timeliness of corporate and audit reports: some empiri-
cal evidence in the French context. International Journal of Accounting 37,
215–246.
tein, J., 1997. How institutions learn: A socio-cognitive perspective. Journal
of Economic Issues XXXI (3), 729–740.
toll, H.R., 2000. Friction. Journal of Finance 55, 1480–1514.
estphal, J.D., Zajac, E.J., 1994. Substance and symbolism in CEOs’
long-term incentive plans. Administrative Science Quarterly 39,
367–390.
illiamson, O.E., 2002. The theory of the firm as governance struc-
ture: From choice to contract. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (3),
171–195.
orld Bank Governance indicators, 2011. World Bank Governance Indi-
cators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp, Accessed 15
September 2011.
